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Constitutional Law-DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR DIVORCE
HELD NOT TO VIOLATE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975).
One of the legacies of the Warren era was the development of a strict
standard of judicial review in certain cases brought under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Once the Court determined that
a fundamental interest had been infringed or denied, the new equal protec-
tion analysis required that the challenged statute pass a "compelling inter-
est" test,2 or be found in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Various
interests have been recognized as fundamental and afforded special protec-
tion by the Court.3
A fundamental interest which extended into many areas of the law was
the right to interstate travel.' In Shapiro v. Thompson,5 the Court de-
clared that any statutory classification which penalized the right to travel,
unless shown necessary to promote a compelling state interest, was uncon-
stitutional. Thus, durational residency requirements for welfare assis-
tance were struck down as unjustified restrains on the right to interstate
1. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. See, e.g., Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065
(1969). The "compelling interest" or strict scrutiny test presumes a challenged statute uncon-
stitutional for infringing upon a protected right. Thus, the burden of proof rests with the state
and the Court utilizes a thorough means-end analysis. The end of the legislation must not
only be legitimate, but must promote a compelling state interest. In addition, the means must
be the least drastic method of promoting the end.
3. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963) and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to an appeal in the criminal
process); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
4. The constitutional right to travel from one state to another . . . occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union . . . . Although there have been
recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional
right . . . [aill have agreed that the right exists. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757, 759 (1966).
While the Court has not cited specific constitutional authority for the right to interstate
travel, Chief Justice Warren has said it is based on the commerce clause. Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 648 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). However, Justice Harlan postulated
the right was based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 671 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
5. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
6. Id. at 634. In Shapiro, the Supreme Court first declared that a classification based on
old and new residents should be analyzed under the "compelling interest" equal protection
test. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White &
Marshall, JJ.); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 989 (1969).
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travel. The next major application of this right came in Dunn v. Blum-
stein,7 where a state residency requirement for voting was held violative
of equal protection.' A durational residency requirement for nonemer-
gency medical care for indigents was held unconstitutional as restricting
the right to "migrate, 'with intent to settle and abide'" in Memorial Hos-
pital v. Maricopa County?
These decisions led to confusion over the legality of various state resi-
dency laws, including those concerning divorce. Over a century ago, the
Supreme Court declared the states the exclusive regulators of domestic
relations.'" However, the Court remained sensitive to state interference
with the marital relationship-"one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."" State residency require-
ments for divorce were increasingly challenged as violative of equal protec-
tion and due process in that they penalized the right to travel and fore-
closed access to the courts.'" State and federal courts were reaching varying
7. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
8. The fundamental right to vote was also involved in this case. Id. at 336.
9. 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974), quoting from Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st
Cir. 1970). It should be noted that the general trend in Burger Court decisions has been to
narrow and confine the fundamental interests of the Warren Court era. See, e.g., San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth not a suspect classification,
education not a fundamental interest); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing not a
fundamental interest); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare not a fundamen-
tal right). See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
10. "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the
subject of divorce. . . ... Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 186, 187 (1859). "The State,
for example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation
between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved."
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (dictum); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S.'162
(1899); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
11. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The Court first recognized marriage as an
important, basic right reserved to the people in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
Id. at 541.
12. See McCay v. South Dakota, 366 F. Supp. 1244 (D.S.D. 1973); Larsen v. Gallogly, 361
F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1973); Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973);
Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd sub nom., Makres v. Askew,
500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974); Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 53 Hawaii 302, 492 P.2d 939 (1972); Porter v. Porter, 112 N.H. 403,
296 A.2d 900 (1972); Sternschuss v. Sternschuss, 71 Misc. 2d 552, 336 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup.
Ct. 1972); Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 530 (1972); Stottlemyer v.
Stottlemyer, 224 Pa. Super. 123, 302 A.2d 830 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Place v. Place, 129
Vt. 326, 278 A.2d 710 (1971).
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conclusions,' 3 based on different interpretations of Shapiro, Dunn and
Maricopa County. The Supreme Court had expressly left the issue open
by its statements in Shapiro.'4
In Sosna v. Iowa,'5 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a
state's denial of a divorce to a recent interstate traveler fell within the
prohibitory scope of Shapiro and its progeny. The case was of further
interest since the Court had shown sensitivity towards certain aspects of
the marital relationship.'" The plaintiff, Carol Sosna, moved from New
York to Iowa with her three children in August of 1972, after being sepa-
rated from her husband for a year." She petitioned for divorce one month
later in the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa.'" The court dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction, since neither party had been a resident
of Iowa for one year prior to filing, a statutory requirement in the state.'9
Mrs. Sosna then brought a class action2" in federal district court, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief.2 The petitioner contended that Iowa's
13. A trend developed, with state courts tending to uphold residency requirements and
federal courts tending to strike them down. See 43 FORD. L. REv. 857 (1975); 52 N.C.L. Rv.
1279 (1974).
14. We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements
determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license
to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote
compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other hand, may not be penalties
upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel. 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
15. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
16. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
17. 419 U.S. at 395.
18. Id.
19. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Except where the respondent is a resident of this state and is served by personal
service, the petition for dissolution of marriage, in addition to setting forth the infor-
mation required by section 598.5, must state that the petitioner has been for the last
year a resident of the state, specifying the county in which the petitioner has resided,
and the length of such residence therein after deducting all absences from the state;
and that the maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the
purpose of obtaining a marriage dissolution only.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.9 (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides that "[i]f the averments as to residence
are not fully proved, the hearing shall proceed no further, and the action be dismissed by the
court."
20. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Mrs. Sosna was representing the
class of those residents of the State of Iowa who have resided therein for a period of
less than one year and who desire to initiate actions for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, and who are barred from doing so by the one-year durational residency
requirement embodied in Section 598.6 and 598.9 of the Code of Iowa. 419 U.S. at 397.
21. 419 U.S. at 396.
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durational residency requirement established two classes of persons, and
violated the fourteenth amendment because there was no compelling state
interest for the discrimination against her class, i.e., those who had re-
cently exercised their right to interstate travel."2 Further, she claimed
Iowa's irrebuttable presumption against the bona fides of her residency
violated the due process clause by denying her an opportunity in court to
overcome the presumption.2 A three judge court2 upheld the constitution-
ality of the Iowa statute.?
On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Rehn-
quist, found that the residency requirement did not conflict with the
Constitution.26 Before discussing the merits, the Court addressed the issue
of whether the appellant's case should be declared moot and dismissed
because it no longer presented a case or controversy.27 Since article III of
the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to "cases" and "controver-
sies," this determination was crucial. The Court concluded Mrs. Sosna
did have standing, even though her particular case was moot, because the
district court had certified her case as a class action" and she remained
an adequate class representative.3' The appellant had fulfilled Iowa's juris-
dictional requirement and, further, had obtained a divorce in New York.2
22. Id. at 405.
23. Id.
24. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970), a three judge panel must be convened to decide
whether enforcement of a state statute should be enjoined.
25. 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
26. 419 U.S. at 396.
27. The mootness issue has arisen in several interesting contexts and has been an impor-
tant threshold determination in recent years. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)
(voting rights); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (school admissions requirements);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 13 (1973) (abortion);
Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973) (unemployment benefits);
SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (corporate proxy ballots); Hall
v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (voting); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (ballot qualifica-
tions).
28. U.S. CONsT. art. m, § 2.
29. Mootness is one of several doctrines the Supreme Court has developed to determine
whether the case fulfills the case and controversy requirement. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968); 13 C. WRIGHr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, §§ 3529-36 (1975); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court -A Functional Analysis,
86 HA v. L. REv. 645 (1973).
30. But cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
32. 419 U.S. at 399. The issue remained a live controversy for the appellant's class because
"state officials will undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged statute and yet, because
of the passage of time, no single challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for the period
necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion." Id. at 400. See also Dunn v. Blumstein,
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Addressing the equal protection issue, the Court utilized the "rational
basis" test characteristic of the older, more deferential form of equal pro-
tection inquiry. The residency requirement was found to be rationally
related to two valid state interests and thus its constitutionality was af-
firmed. First, since a divorce decree involves many parties and a variety
of issues, Iowa had a legitimate interest in insuring that divorce petitioners
had a "modicum of attachment to the State. '3 4 Second, was "the State's
parallel interests in both avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in
which another State has a paramount interest, and in minimizing the
susceptibility of its own decrees to collateral attack." 5 Justice Rehnquist
found a clear distinction between Iowa's divorce statute and the statutes
in Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa County. The residency requirements in
the latter three cases had been struck down because the budgetary and
record-keeping interests advanced by the state did not outweigh the indi-
vidual rights asserted .3 However, in Sosna, valid state interests were found
and the individual rights claimed were merely incidentally infringed.
Justice Marshall, the author of Dunn and Maricopa County, joined by
Justice Brennan, the author of Shapiro, severely criticized the majority's
approach. He felt the residency requirement was accorded undue deference
instead of being subjected to the strict judicial scrutiny of prior cases.3 7
405 U.S. 330 (1972); 43 FoRD. L. REv. 857 (1975). Justice White strongly objected to this
aspect of the case without commenting on the merits:
In reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the case, no member of the class before
the Court . . . . [T]his case has become one-sided and has lost the adversary quality
necessary to satisfy the constitutional 'case or controversy' requirement . . . . The
Court thus dilutes the jurisdictional command of art. I to a mere prudential guide-
line. 419 U.S. at 412 (White, J., dissenting).
33. The underlying theme of the "rational basis" test is that people similarly situated
should be treated in a similar fashion. Thus, states are prohibited from treating people
differently unless the statutory criteria are rational and the classifications are related to a
permissible object of regulation. The Court has used four canons of construction which give
statutory schemes wide discretion and presume that they are constitutional. "The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and
therefore is purely arbitrary." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
34. 419 U.S. at 407. The opinion identified marital status, property rights, custody and
support matters as the important issues usually settled through divorce proceedings.
35. Id. Justice Rehnquist elaborated, "A State such as Iowa may quite reasonably decide
that it does not wish to become a divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as
short a time as appellant ... " Id.
36. Id. at 406.
37. As we have made clear in Shapiro and subsequent cases, any classification that
penalizes exercise of the constitutional right to travel is invalid unless it is justified
[Vol. 10:418
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According to Justice Marshall's analysis, divorce was of sufficient impor-
tance to justify application of the "compelling interest" test due to the
penalty on interstate travel."
Regarding the appellant's due process allegation, the crucial factor in
determining the Court's holding was that the "[jappellant was not irre-
trievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought ....
Iowa's requirement delayed her access to the courts, but, by fulfilling it, a
petitioner could ultimately obtain the same opportunity for adjudication
... )-3 By application of the "rational basis" equal protection analysis
and utilization of a "total deprivation" due process standard, the Court
accorded greater weight to the latter aspect of this case. In prior cases
where the right to travel was allegedly infringed, the burden of proof was
on the state to show that its statute advanced a "compelling interest" in
the least drastic way." In Sosna, the burden of proof was on the appellant
to show that she was totally deprived of an important right.
Justice Rehnquist found distinguishable an earlier holding which
struck down a Connecticut residency requirement for reduced in-state
college tuition.4' In that case, the petitioner had been denied reduced
by a compelling governmental interest .... The Court's failure to address the instant
case in these terms suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis we have applied
to this corner of equal protection law. In its stead, the Court has employed what
appears to be an ad hoc balancing test .... Id. at 418-19.
38. Adhering to his dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 109 (1973), Justice Marshall stated in Sosna that "the 'rational basis' test has no place in
equal protection analysis when important individual interests with constitutional implica-
tions are at stake. . . ." 419 U.S. at 420. See generally Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr.
Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. IcH.
L. REv. 181 (1975).
39. 419 U.S. at 406.
40. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (opinion of
Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638 (1969).
41. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). Mrs. Sosna had relied on this case as setting forth
the proper test to be applied in her case. Instead, the Court found the due process analysis
of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), more applicable to the facts in Sosna. In
Boddie, it was held that the state could not deny indigents access to divorce courts simply
because they could not afford the filing fee:
Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their
claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. 401 U.S. at 377.
The appellants in Boddie were totally deprived access to the courts, a clear violation of due
process. However, "the gravamen of appellant Sosna's claim [was] not total deprivation...
but only delay." 419 U.S. at 410. This reasoning was consistent with Boddie:
In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
1976]
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tuition "on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of
nonresidence, when that presumption [was] not necessarily or universally
true in fact, and when the State [had] reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination." 2 The opinion further stated that due
process required Connecticut to give the petitioner a chance to present
evidence to rebut the presumption. 3 The Court in Sosna pointed out that
the Connecticut statute involved petitioner's "domicile" for a state bene-
fit, whereas Iowa's statute involved "residence" for state court jurisdic-
tion.44 Justice Rehnquist stated that prior Court decisions did not foreclose
the use of a residency requirement as one element in determining bona fide
residence." Thus, the Court's strict "total deprivation" analysis combined
with the rational basis for the Iowa law and its mere incidental impact on
interstate travel upheld the residency requirement for divorce.
these appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a divorce, we
wish to re-emphasize that we go no further than necessary to dispose of the case before
us . . . .We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right...
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. . . .401 U.S. at 382.
42. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). It should be noted that Justice Rehnquist
dissented in this case, contending the majority opinion was based on "highly abstract and
theoretical analysis" which ignored the valid state interests. Id. at 468. On several other
occasions, Justice Rehnquist has expressed his distaste for the "irrebuttable presumption"
analysis. "There is a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, holding unconstitu-
tional on procedural due process grounds presumptions which conclude factual inquiries
without a hearing ... and, on the other hand, holding unconstitutional a duly enacted
prophylactic limitation. . . ."Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 524 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For other "irrebuttable presumption" cases see Jimenez v. Wein-
berger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See also Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note,
Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975) (both articles
criticize this due process approach).
43. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 452.
44. 419 U.S. at 409-10.
45. Id. at 409. The case of Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd,
401 U.S. 985 (1971), was referred to as support for this proposition. In Starns, a state residency
requirement was upheld because evidence to rebut the presumption could be presented in
court. In Weinberger v. Salfi, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975), sections of the Social Security Act
survived a due process challenge involving a nine month residency requirement for benefits.
The Court emphasized that the time requirement was merely a threshold determination as
in Starns. Unlike Vlandis, the parties were allowed to present evidence to overcome the
presumption and prove that they were bona fide claimants. Id. at 2470. Thus, a clear conflict
has arisen concerning challenges to a statute on due process grounds. Rather than clearly
overruling the "irrebuttable presumptions" analysis developed in 1/andis and later cases, the
Court has tried to distinguish subsequent cases. However, in the process of distinguishing
cases, the Court has recognized the importance of the opportunity to present additional
evidence. This opportunity was not present in Sosna. Yet, the Iowa statute was held not to
violate due process.
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Justice Marshall also found the majority's due process analysis inade-
quate." He conceded the need for Iowa to determine residency to safeguard
the integrity of its decrees 7 and thus insure that they be accorded "[f]ull
faith and credit"'8 by other states. Yet, even the one year requirement was
not absolute insurance against collateral attack. 9 Justice Marshall be-
lieved the legitimate state interests "would be adequately protected by a
simple requirement of domicile-physical presence plus intent to re-
main-which would remove the rigid one-year barrier while permitting the
State to restrict the availability of its divorce process to citizens who are
genuinely its own.""0
The majority opinion in Sosna failed to explain why Iowa's statute was
not subjected to the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis normally
utilized when a fundamental interest is infringed. The reasons for the
Court's return to a more deferential standard and its implications for fu-
ture cases are unclear. It appears that despite the expansive rulings in
Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa County, in certain instances, the right to
interstate travel will not alone be enough to trigger strict judicial scrutiny.
A crucial factor in the Court's analysis, bringing procedural due process
considerations into the equation, is whether the deprivation is total or
merely delayed. In some cases, the Court must decide whether any delay
amounts to unconscionable deprivation. An ad hoc balancing process
seems to be guiding the Court in its decisions, rather than any concrete,
structured analysis. The jagged line representing the limits and extensions
of the Burger Court's protection under the fourteenth amendment has been
somewhat delineated." Future cases will have the task of clarification, but
46. [The majority's] analysis .. . ignores the severity of the deprivation suffered
by the divorce petitioner, who is forced to wait a year for relief .... The injury
accompanying that delay is not directly measurable in money terms like the loss of
welfare benefits [in Shapiro], but it cannot reasonably be argued that when the year
has elapsed, the petitioner is made whole. 419 U.S. at 421-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 424.
48. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
49. 419 U.S. at 426. Justice Marshall in other cases has tried to move the Court away from
rigid residency requirements and towards this more flexible concept. "In most cases, it is no
more difficult to determine whether one recently arrived in the community has sufficient
intent to remain to qualify as a resident than it is to make a similar determination for an
older inhabitant." Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 55 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see 51
TExAs L. REV. 585 (1973).
50. 419 U.S. at 424 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. While the "irrebuttable presumptions" standard is a relatively new mode of procedural
due process analysis for the Court, it has become a source of clear division. Five Justices
approved its application to invalidate statutes in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and
six approved this form of scrutiny in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), Department of
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
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Sosna settled the issue of the validity of state residency requirements in
the area of divorce. While several members of the Court's "Warren era"
continue to object to the new approaches," the Burger Court's evolution
is proceeding within a discernible framework.
S.D.S.
632 (1974). Justice Rehnquist wrote dissents in Vlandis, Murry and LaFleur severely criticiz-
ing the approach as improper. During the last Court term a definite shift occurred, indicating
a new dislike for utilization of the "irrebuttable presumptions" analysis. Justice Rehnquist,
formerly in the minority, wrote the majority opinions rejecting the analysis in Sosna and
Weinberger v. Salfi, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975). Only Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas
continue to favor the approach, although Justice Douglas joined the majority opinion in
Sosna, showing even his hesitancy. What this shift means in terms of the Court's due process
analysis is unclear. One possible explanation could be the differences between the classes of
statutes challenged or the particular petitioner's situation. To date, no clear explanation has
been given by the Court. With each case there has been an ad hoc reevaluation which has
tended to narrow this type of analysis.
52. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Seach of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Tribe, Foreword: Toward
a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HAlv. L. REv. 1 (1973); Yackle,
Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr. Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in
the Supreme Court, 9 U. RIcH. L. REv. 181 (1975).
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